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Abstract— Network coding increases throughput and
is robust against failures and erasures. However, since it
allows mixing of information within the network, a single
corrupted packet generated by a Byzantine attacker can
easily contaminate the information to multiple destinations.
In this paper, we study the transmission overhead associ-
ated with three different schemes for detecting Byzantine
adversaries at a node using network coding: end-to-end
error correction, packet-based Byzantine detection scheme,
and generation-based Byzantine detection scheme. In end-
to-end error correction, it is known that we can correct
up to the min-cut between the source and destinations.
However, if we use Byzantine detection schemes, we can
detect polluted data, drop them, and therefore, only transmit
valid data. For the dropped data, the destinations perform
erasure correction, which is computationally lighter than
error correction. We show that, with enough attackers present
in the network, Byzantine detection schemes may improve
the throughput of the network since we choose to forward
only reliable information. When the probability of attack is
high, a packet-based detection scheme is the most bandwidth
efficient; however, when the probability of attack is low, the
overhead involved with signing each packet becomes costly,
and the generation-based scheme may be preferred. Finally,
we characterize the tradeoff between generation size and
overhead of detection in bits as the probability of attack
increases in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding, which was first introduced in [1],
allows algebraic mixing of information in the inter-
mediate nodes. This mixing has been shown to have
numerous performance benefits. It is known that network
coding maximizes throughput [1], as well as robustness
against failures [2] and erasures [3]. However, a major
concern for network coding system is its vulnerability
to Byzantine adversaries. A single corrupted packet
generated by a Byzantine adversary can contaminate
all the information to a destination, and propagate to
other destinations quickly. For example, in random linear
network coding [3], one corrupted packet in a generation
can prevent a receiver from decoding any data from that
generation even if all the other packets it has received
are valid.
There are several papers that attempt to address this
problem. One approach is to correct the errors injected
by the Byzantine adversaries using network error cor-
rection [4]. Reference [4] bounds the maximum achiev-
able rate in an adversarial setting, and generalizes the
Hamming, Gilbert-Varshamov, and Singleton bounds.
Furthermore, Jaggi et al. [5] propose a distributed, rate-
optimal, network coding scheme for multicast network
that is resilient in the presence of Byzantine adversaries.
However, this introduces another question: if the exis-
tence of Byzantine adversaries within the network is sus-
pected, can we do better than just using error correction
codes? Rather than just naively using error correcting
codes at the destinations, can we actively detect and
drop corrupted packets? If so, what kind of detection
scheme should we use? In addition, with the overhead
associated with Byzantine detection in coded systems,
do we still outperform the non-coded solution? The goal
of this paper is to answer some of these questions.
We compare the overhead associated with Byzantine
detection schemes in terms of bits – polluted packets
that are sent or unpolluted packets that are dropped,
as well as bits used for hashes to detect attacks –
and the amount of bandwidth saved from employing
such detection schemes. The computational overhead
associated with computing the hashes, or checking for
corrupted packets will be dealt with elsewhere.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
present the background and related material. In Section
III, we introduce our network model. In Section IV, we
analyze the overhead associated with the three Byzantine
detection schemes. In Section V, we study the trade-
offs of different detection schemes, as the probability
of Byzantine attack varies. Finally, we summarize our
contributions of this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Network Coding
Reference [1] shows that network coding allows a
source to multicast information at a rate approaching
the smallest cut between the source and any receiver, as
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the coding symbol size approaches infinity. Li et al. [6]
show that linear network coding is sufficient for multicast
networks to achieve the optimum. Subsequently, Koetter
et al. [2] present an algebraic framework for linear
network coding in arbitrary networks.
As a result, there has been a great emphasis on linear
network coding. For instance, Ho et al. [7] propose a
simple, practical capacity-achieving code, in which every
node construct its linear code randomly and indepen-
dently from all other nodes. This simple construction
has been shown to achieve capacity with probability
approaching 1 exponentially fast with the field size. This
result indicates that linear network coding is a simple
yet a very powerful tool. Furthermore, Lun et al. [3]
show that random block linear network coding system
achieves capacity. In a random block linear network
coding system, a source generates information in blocks
of G packets (called a generation). The source then
multicasts to its destination nodes using random linear
network coding, where only the packets from the same
generation are mixed. In this paper, we shall consider
systems that use random block linear network coding.
It is important to note that random linear network
coding is a distributed protocol, which requires no state
information. It uses the encoding vector – a vector of
coefficients of the linear transformation of the original
packets – to encode/decode the original data. Therefore,
random block linear network coding is resilient in dy-
namic/unstable networks where state information may
change rapidly or may be hard to obtain.
B. End-to-end error correction scheme
In [5], Jaggi et al. introduce the first distributed
polynomial-time rate-optimal network codes that work
in the presence of Byzantine nodes and is information-
theoretically secure. In their work, Jaggi et al. present
algorithms that are resilient against adversaries of differ-
ent capabilities. Given an adversary who can eavesdrop
on all links and jam z links, their algorithm achieves a
rate of C − 2z, where C is the network capacity; given
an adversary who can observe only ze links and jam z
links where ze < C − 2z, the algorithm achieves a rate
of C − z. These rates are the maximum achievable rate
given the power of the adversary.
The idea behind this algorithm is that the corrupted
packets injected by the adversary can be considered as
packets from a secondary source; therefore, with enough
information at the destinations, the destination nodes can
decode both the legitimate source’s packets as well as the
adversary’s packets. To allow the destination nodes to
distinguish the legitimate packets from the adversary’s
packets, the source judiciously adds redundancy such
that the adversary’s packets cannot satisfy the constraints
imposed by the redundancy. For instance, the source may
add redundancy so that a certain functions evaluate to
zero on the source’s packets.
C. Packet-based Byzantine detection scheme
There are several signature schemes that have been
presented in the literature. For instance, [8][9] use ho-
momorphic hash functions to detect polluted packets.
In addition, Charles et al. [10] propose a signature
scheme for network coding based on Weil pairing on
elliptic curves. Although this scheme does not require
a secure channel, it is computationally expensive. In
[11], Fang et al. propose a signature scheme for network
coding, which makes use of the linearity property of
the packets in a coded system. This scheme does not
require intermediate nodes to decode coded packets to
check the validity of a packet; therefore, it is efficient
in terms of computational cost as well as delay. In this
paper, we shall consider the signature scheme from [11],
which is designed for transmitting large files that are
broken into blocks viewed as vectors. Taking advantage
of the fact that in linear network coding, any valid packet
transmitted should belong to the subspace spanned by the
original set of vectors, Fang et al. design a signature that
can be used to easily check the membership of a received
vector in the given subspace, while making it hard to
generate a fake signature that is not in the subspace but
passes the check.
The overhead associated with the signature scheme
is also analyzed in [11]. Given a file, we break it into
m blocks/vectors, which are elements in n-dimensional
vector space Fnp . Then, the size of the file, a vector,
and the coding vectors are mn log p, n log p, and (m+
n) log p, respectively. This scheme requires a public key
K of size at least (m+n) log q, where q is a large prime
number such that p is a divisor of (q − 1). In a typical
cryptographic applications, p is 160 bits, q 1024 bits,
and K approximately 6(m+ n)/mn times the file size.
It is important to note that although the overhead of the
signature is quite small (less than 0.1% of the file size),
the overhead of the key distribution can be quite large.
The cost of key distribution is not considered in [11].
This detection scheme assumes no knowledge of the
bandwidth available between the source and the desti-
nations – therefore, can validate packets under varying
degree of attack. Thus, this algorithm achieves rate of
C−z minus the overhead of the signature scheme, where
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the network and a non-malicious node v
C is the network capacity, and z is the rate at which the
adversary can inject packets into the network.
D. Generation-based Byzantine detection scheme
In [12], Ho et al. introduce an information-theoretic
approach for detecting Byzantine adversaries, which
only assumes that the adversary did not see all linear
combinations of the source packets received by the
destinations. They propose a scheme whose detection
probability varies with the length of the hash k, coding
field size q, and the amount of information about the
random code unknown to the adversary s. A polynomial
hash of a flexible length is augmented to each packet
in the generation. Once the destination node receives
enough packets to decode a generation, the destination
node can decode the set and detect error with probability
at most
(
k+1
q
)s
. The intuition behind this scheme is that
if a packet is reliable, then its data and hash symbols
are consistent with its coefficient vector; and a linear
combination of reliable packets is also reliable. In [12],
Ho et al. design a hash function, which is both efficient
to compute and difficult to forge without seeing all valid
packets and their coding coefficients.
This generation based scheme is very cheap and sensi-
tive. For example, with 2% overhead (k = 50), log q = 7,
s = 5, the detection probability is at least 98.9%; with
1% overhead (k = 100), log q = 8, s = 5, the detection
probability is at least 99.0%. Furthermore, this scheme
does not require any key agreement/distribution; thus,
making it much cheaper than the packet-based scheme.
However, this is a block code, unlike the signature
scheme from Section II-C; therefore, will require a priori
decision on the rate. In addition, the detection can only
occur at a node with enough packets from a generation
– thus, can incur large delays.
III. NETWORK MODEL
We model the network by a directed graph G =
(V,E), where V is the set of nodes in the network, and
E is the set of communication links. There are subsets
of nodes, S and T ⊆ V , which wish to send and receive
data respectively.
In this paper, we consider a non-malicious node
v ∈ R. Node v wishes to check the validity of the
packet/generation that it forwards. For the packet-based
Byzantine detection scheme from Section II-C, v is given
the public key K; for the generation-based Byzantine
detection scheme from Section II-D, v is allowed to
decode a generation, if all the packets of the given
generation goes through it.
Assume that node v receives m packets (n bits each)
per time unit. If it detects an error/attack, then v discards
that data; otherwise, the v acts like any other node in the
network and forwards the data.
A key parameter to consider in this work is the
probability pv of an attack to the node v. At any given
time, the probability that v receives a packet modified
by the Byzantine attacker is pv as shown in Figure 1.
Therefore, the expected number of corrupted packets
that v receives is mpv. It is important to note that the
probability pv of an attack is topology dependent (in
terms of the location of v, Byzantine attackers, as well
as the source nodes); thus, pv may be different for each
node v. We shall assume that there is an external model
of vulnerability which will give an estimate of pv.
In the remaining of the paper, we shall focus on a
single non-malicious node v, and the overhead associated
with the detection schemes through this one node. This
is a reasonable approach, since we are not concerned
with how a malicious node uses its bandwidth. Since
we are considering a specific node v from now on, we
will denote pv as p, unless specified otherwise. In the
next sections, we compare the cost and the benefit of
employing Byzantine detection schemes with varying p.
IV. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
A. Overhead of end-to-end error correction
In an end-to-end error correction scheme, the network
can achieve rate of C−z where C is the network capacity
and the adversary can jam z links. Therefore, end-to-
end error correction can correct up to the reliable min-
cut of the source-destinations. Thus, using this scheme,
as long as the attack is within the network capacity,
the intermediate nodes can transmit at the remaining
network capacity; and the destination nodes employ error
correction to retrieve reliable packets. It is important
to note that error correction is computationally more
expensive than erasure correction, which shall be used
when Byzantine detection schemes are used.
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In this scheme, node v acts as a normal intermediate
node – it does not check the validity of the packet it has
received. It just naively performs random linear network
coding and forwards the information it has received.
Therefore, in terms of bits transmitted at v, we lose on
average mnp-bits, where n is the length of a packet, m
is number of packets v receives per time unit, and p is
the probability that any packet v receives is corrupted.
Therefore, the ratio between the overhead or corrupted
bits transmitted and total bits received is:
mnp
mn
= p. (1)
B. Overhead of Byzantine detection for packets
In this section, we analyze the overhead associated
with the packet-based Byzantine detection algorithm
(Section II-C). We consider the scenario where node
v checks the validity of every packet it receives using
the public key K available to it. Then, v uses random
linear network coding to forward only the packets that
passed the check. If v detects an error in a packet,
then it discards it – by doing so, v does not waste
its bandwidth in transmitting corrupted data with high
probability, and destination nodes perform erasure cor-
rection on the packets that have been dropped, which is
computationally cheaper than error correction required
for the error correction scheme in Section IV-A. How-
ever, each packet needs to contain enough information (a
polynomial hash) that can be used to verify its integrity.
This overhead associated with the Byzantine detection
scheme reduces the rate at which data is transmitted.
Assume that this polynomial hash is of size hp bits per
packet. Before analyzing the cost/benefit of the packet-
based detection scheme, we first study the rate of actual
data transmission. Since p-fraction of packets received
by v is erroneous, v only forwards in total mn −mnp
bits per unit time, of which only (1 − hp
n
) fraction of
the bits are actual data bits. Thus, the ratio between the
actual data bits transmitted and total bits transmitted is:
(mn−mnp)(1− hp
n
)
mn−mnp
= 1−
hp
n
.
This result is not a surprising one – as it shows that
when we employ a Byzantine detection scheme, v can
filter out all the corrupted packets. As a result, every bit
v transmits is a valid data bit. This analysis also extends
to that of generation-based Byzantine detection scheme
in Section IV-C.
The overhead associated with the packet-based Byzan-
tine detection scheme can be analyzed as follows. By
discarding the corrupted packets, node v can on average
save its bandwidth by mnp bits per unit time at a cost
of hp bits per packet. Therefore, the expected cost of the
this scheme at v is: max{0,m(hp − np)} bits per time
unit. Therefore, the ratio between the overhead and the
total bits received is:
max{0,m(hp − np)}
mn
=
max{0, hp − np}
n
. (2)
When the probability of error p is high enough, then
checking each packet for error saves on bits transmitted
– i.e. m(hp − np) < 0, which shows that the cost
of the signature scheme is canceled by the bandwidth
gained from dropping the corrupted packets, and thus,
reduces the overall cost to zero. Therefore, this approach
is the most sensible when the network is expected to be
unreliable or under heavy attack.
It is important to note that the packet-based Byzantine
detection scheme assumes the presence of a public key
distribution infrastructure, the details of which we are not
concerned with here. However, there are transmission as
well as computational overhead associated with such an
assumption, which has been studied in [13][14]. Further-
more, this packet-based detection scheme is designed for
a large file which is broken into small blocks. Therefore,
every new file requires a new public key; the cost of key
distribution becomes a significant part of the overhead of
this signature scheme. Thus, depending on the public key
distribution infrastructure used and the frequency of key
renewal, the packet-based detection scheme will incur a
much higher overhead. This would result in shifting the
transmission overhead in Figure 4 outwards.
C. Overhead of Byzantine detection for generations
In this section, we shall assume our system uses
random block linear network coding with generation size
G. In this generation-based Byzantine detection scheme,
a node checks for possible error/attack on a generation
after collecting enough packets from the generation. If
the node detects an error, then it discards the entire
generation of G packets; otherwise, it forwards the
data. The destination nodes perform erasure correction
on the generations that have been dropped, which is
computationally cheaper than error correction required
in Section IV-A.
Thus, this scheme requires only one hash for the entire
generation — saving bits on the hashes compared to the
packet-based detection scheme. However, one corrupted
packet in a generation can make a node drop the entire
generation and make the network inefficient.
For a more detailed analysis on the overhead associ-
ated with this scheme, assume that the hash is of size
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hg bits per generation. The probability of dropping a
generation of G packets is given by:
pg = Pr(generation dropped)
= 1− Pr(All G packets are valid)
= 1− (1− p)G.
Therefore, the probability that a generation is for-
warded by v is 1 − pg = (1 − p)G; node v is expected
to transmit (1 − p)GnG bits per unit time. By similar
analysis as in Section IV-B, the fraction of actual data
bits of the (1− p)GnG transmitted bits is 1− hg
nG
.
The overhead associated with this scheme includes
the hash of hg bits per generation. However, unlike the
packet-based detection scheme, this scheme may drop
uncorrupted packets along with the corrupted packets,
if a generation is deemed corrupted. Therefore, the
overhead of the generation-based detection scheme also
needs to include the uncorrupted packets that were
dropped. The expected number of uncorrupted bits in
a generation is given by: (1 − p)nG bits. Therefore,
the expected uncorrupted bits dropped per generation is:
pg(1− p)nG bits.
However, this scheme saves on bandwidth by dropping
generations with corrupted packets. On average, there
are pnG corrupted bits in a each generation. Therefore,
the expected overall overhead (in bits) of Byzantine
detection per generation is:
max{0, hg + pg(1− p)nG− pnG} bits.
Thus, the ratio between the overhead and the total bits
received is:
max{0, hg + pg(1− p)nG− pnG}
nG
. (3)
It is important to note that, for this scheme to work,
v needs to receive at least G packets from each gener-
ation so that it can decode the generation and use the
generation-based Byzantine detection scheme to detect
attackers. This may seem to indicate that this scheme
is only applicable as an end-to-end Byzantine detection
scheme or requires that v receives all packets, but it can
be used as a local Byzantine detection scheme.
Consider a network with non-malicious nodes A, B,
C, D, E, and F, as shown in Figure 2, and assume
that this network uses the generation-based Byzantine
detection scheme with generation size G. In this network,
node A is transmitting data at rate r to node F; however,
A sends half of its data through B and the other half
through C. It may seem that nodes B and C cannot
check the validity of any generation transmitted by A
Fig. 2. Network with non-malicious nodes A, B, C, D, E, and F
where node A is transmitting at a total rate of r to node F
since it is unlikely that they will receive enough packets
from any generation; however, B and C can check the
validity of the sub-generation they receive, where by
sub-generation, we mean a collection of G/2 encoded
packets from A. By a similar argument, D, E, and F
can check the validity of a sub-generation of G/4, G/4,
and G packets from A, respectively. Therefore, a node
can check every sub-generation it forwards.
V. TRADE-OFFS
In this section, we choose hp = 6100n and hg =
2
100
nG. As noted in Section II-C, the signature and
the public key used in the packet-based scheme are
approximately 0.1% and 6(m+n)/mn ≈ 6% of the data
file size. In any public key infrastructure, the public key
has to be transmitted at least once, therefore, we make an
underestimate of the cost and choose hp = 6100n. From
Section II-D, the hash for the generation-based scheme
is approximately 2% of the transmitted bits.
A. A comparison of coded and non-coded systems
A non-coded system, unlike its coded counterpart,
requires state information such as network topology or
buffer information. As a result, the most effective attack
on a routing network is an attack on the control traffic.
However, as we noted in Section II-A, network coding
systems are robust against such an attack; making it
especially more robust in dynamic/unstable networks.
In addition, for an effective Byzantine detection in a
routing network, we need all nodes in the network to
be authenticated; therefore, each packet would need a
signature as well as a hash to verify the identity of the
sender and the content of the packet. Therefore, a non-
coded system would incur overhead similar to that of
packet-based scheme without the benefit of throughput
gain due to network coding. There are various literature
on the overhead analysis of secure routing protocols,
especially for wireless ad hoc networks [15][16]. In [16],
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it has been shown that these routing protocols can incur
up to 24% overhead; making the cost of detection non-
negligible without the performance benefits of coding.
B. Generation size G in the generation-based scheme
In Figure 3, we see that given an error probability p,
as generation size increases, the cost of the generation-
based scheme increases dramatically. If the generation
size G is large enough, there will be at least one
corrupted packet in a generation with high probability
even for small p. This can be easily verified with an
asymptotic analysis of Equation 3 as G→∞:
lim
G→∞
max{0, hg + pg(1− p)nG− pnG}
nG
→ max{0, 1 − 2p}.
This indicates that a large generation size is unde-
sirable – as almost every generation is found faulty
and dropped; making the network throughput to zero.
However, this constraint should not become a relevant
limiting factor in many MANET systems, since the gen-
eration sizes are kept small to keep the coding/decoding
cost low.
Another interesting thing to note in Figure 3 is that
the cost peaks at a probability p ≈ 0.2. At p ≈ 0.2,
the generation-based scheme drops many generations for
a few corrupted packets each generation; as a result,
it drops many valid packets to filter out a few cor-
rupted packets. Thus, at a moderate rate of attack, the
generation-based scheme suffers. When p << 0.2, the
generation-based scheme does well – since the probabil-
ity of error is low and we distribute the cost of hashing
across an entire generation, we do not waste bandwidth.
When 0.2 << p < 0.5, this scheme blocks all generation
that is corrupted – and as a result, the scheme does not
waste bandwidth on corrupted packets. Nodes transmit
only valid information; however, this happens rarely.
This also means that we do not use the bandwidth
to transmit “good” packets since we throw them away
along with the corrupted packets in the generation. When
p > 0.5, the expected throughput is near zero; therefore,
the expected cost is zero since we do not transmit any
corrupted (as well as good) bits.
C. A comparison of the three schemes
In Figures 4 and 5, we compare the three schemes.
As mentioned in Section IV-A, the expected cost of
error correction scheme is linearly proportional to the
error probability. Therefore, when p is large, this scheme
performs badly. However, this simple scheme where
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Fig. 3. Ratio between the expected overhead and the total bits
received by a node for generation-based detection with generation
size G, packet size n = 1000, and hash size hg = 2
100
nG
a node ignores any error/attacks and just forwards all
the information it receives outperforms the detection
schemes when p is low (p < 0.03). When the probability
of error is small, the cost of detection is an overhead that
exceeds the cost introduced by the attackers.
It is interesting to compare the packet-based and the
generation-based scheme. When the probability of error
is low, the overhead of hash is costly for the packet-based
scheme, since it is devoting hp bits per packet to detect
an unlikely attack. In such a setting, the generation-
based scheme performs well — it distributes the cost
of the hash (hg bits) over G packets and still detects
the few attacks that it may encounter. However, as the
probability of attack increases, the cost of hashes become
“cheaper” since the bandwidth wasted by transmitting a
corrupted packets increases. This is where the packet-
based scheme outperforms the generation-based scheme.
However, it is important to note that we underestimate
the overhead associated with the packet-based scheme
in this paper as we do not take into account the public
key distribution cost, which the generation-based scheme
does not require.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
When there are enough attackers present in the
network, Byzantine detection (either packet-based or
generation-based) improves the throughput since we can
choose to only forward information that is clean –
rather than send the corrupted information and have the
destination correct it.
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As mentioned in Section V, if the probability of
receiving a bad packet is high enough (i.e. the number
of corrupted bits is higher than the cost of checking each
packet), then the packet-based Byzantine detection is the
most bandwidth efficient. However, if the probability of
an attack is low, then the overhead of attaching a hash
for every packet becomes costly. Therefore, the genera-
tion approach in Section IV-C is appropriate. However,
although the generations allow us to reduce the cost of
the hash, the probability that a corrupted packet is in
a generation increases with the size of the generation.
Therefore, a right balance between the generation size
and the error probability is needed if we choose to use
generation-based Byzantine detection.
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